After the War

The current phase of the Israel-Hamas war reveals a paradox at the heart of modern conflict: a military campaign that continues without a credible or coherent strategy for its conclusion. While Israeli leadership has articulated the destruction of Hamas as an existential imperative, it has failed to specify what political order or absence thereof, should follow in Gaza. This vacuum has precipitated not only a humanitarian catastrophe but a diplomatic morass, where military success, even if achievable, promises neither strategic clarity nor moral legitimacy. In the absence of a “day after” framework that commands local and international consensus, the war’s trajectory points less toward resolution than toward indefinite occupation, fragmentation, or collapse.

This uncertainty is exacerbated by the simultaneous proliferation of competing postwar proposals from Israeli officials, Arab governments, Western allies, and international organizations. Some envision an Arab-led transitional authority, others the rehabilitation of the discredited Palestinian Authority, and still others propose hybrid security arrangements or externally imposed trusteeships. Yet these scenarios all presuppose a level of coordination, legitimacy, and enforceability that remains conspicuously absent in current diplomacy. At issue is not merely the feasibility of these plans but their compatibility with the aspirations of Palestinians and the strategic calculus of Israeli policymakers. Without a clear and mutually acceptable political horizon, such proposals risk functioning as placeholders rather than blueprints.

The stakes, therefore, extend far beyond the cessation of hostilities. The Gaza war’s conclusion will shape the architecture of Israeli-Palestinian relations, the credibility of U.S. and Arab diplomacy, and the stability of an already volatile region. Any endgame that lacks a governance solution, a path to reconstruction, and a vision of Palestinian self-determination will not constitute peace but merely a strategic intermission. For a durable resolution to emerge, stakeholders must grapple with an uncomfortable but essential truth: the political future of Gaza cannot be postponed until after the war. It must be built into the logic of war termination itself, or risk being buried beneath its rubble.

The Israeli government has made unequivocal its rejection of Hamas rule yet it has failed to articulate a viable alternative. Public officials continue to repeat vague declarations of intent to destroy Hamas, ensure security, and prepare the ground, but the absence of a political strategy renders the military campaign increasingly incoherent. Israeli defense planners remain at odds with political leadership, who either defer the governance question or seek temporary control without clear legal or strategic parameters. This ambiguity sustains a vacuum in which violence persists, humanitarian needs grow more acute, and the prospects for sustainable stabilization diminish daily.

The practical implications of this leadership void are severe. The Israeli Defense Forces, despite battlefield advances, have no mandate to establish civil order, nor is there a framework for reconstituting municipal governance or public services. Reporting from various outlets suggest current Israeli policy discussions entertain scenarios in which Gaza's population could be forced into temporary camps on the ruins of Rafah, an idea that both defies international law and reflects an alarming abdication of responsibility. The absence of a civil authority exacerbates chaos, fuels popular resentment, and sets the stage for renewed insurgency, even if Hamas as an organization is territorially defeated.

Without a credible postwar authority, every military gain risks being nullified by political disarray. Israeli policymakers oscillate between maximalist destruction and minimalist governance, refusing both full reoccupation and meaningful engagement with potential Palestinian successors. Highlighting this policy schizophrenia, noting that the IDF's expanded reserve call-ups suggest preparation for long-term control, even as top officials disavow permanence. As long as no actor is empowered to fill the postwar vacuum, neither the Palestinian Authority, nor a regional coalition, nor an international body, Gaza remains suspended between destruction and disorder, with no political horizon in sight.

The Israeli objective of eliminating Hamas as both a militant force and governing entity lies at the heart of the war’s rationale yet remains a profoundly elusive goal. Historically, non-state actors with deep social and political roots rarely disappear through military means alone. The fragmentation of Hamas into localized networks or underground cells, even if its senior leadership is neutralized, would not erase its ideological appeal or institutional presence in Gaza’s dense civic terrain. More critically, the organization's embeddedness within civilian infrastructure, schools, religious institutions, and humanitarian distribution networks, renders its eradication a proposition fraught with ethical ambiguity and strategic futility. The elimination of Hamas as a combatant entity may well provoke its mutation into a decentralized insurgency, mirroring the trajectory of past groups targeted for annihilation.

Moreover, Hamas has evolved over decades into a hybrid political-military actor whose legitimacy, while contested, is not solely derived from force. The absence of a credible political alternative within Gaza, combined with the historic marginalization of the Palestinian Authority, creates conditions in which Hamas, even decapitated militarily, may retain residual support or symbolic relevance. Public opinion polls, particularly those conducted in the earlier phases of the conflict, reveal persistent divisions among Palestinians regarding Hamas’ role, but few express confidence in the return of PA governance under Israeli auspices. This vacuum of legitimate Palestinian representation poses a central obstacle to any postwar settlement. If Hamas cannot govern, and the PA will not be accepted, then who or what will inherit the ruins?

Israel’s security doctrine, meanwhile, demands control mechanisms that fundamentally conflict with Palestinian aspirations for autonomy. Calls for a buffer zone, increased surveillance infrastructure, and long-term IDF presence within or adjacent to Gaza all reflect deeply rooted anxieties over repeat insurgency or cross-border attacks. Yet these same mechanisms serve to replicate the very conditions of occupation that fueled previous waves of resistance. The logic of total security, underpinned by spatial control and demographic engineering, inevitably encroaches upon the possibility of meaningful Palestinian political agency. The question is no longer whether Israel can secure Gaza, but whether it can do so without perpetuating an indefinite state of siege and dispossession.

What remains unacknowledged in much of the Israeli discourse is that stability cannot emerge from the mere absence of rockets. Lasting peace requires political architecture, not just physical demilitarization. To the extent that Israeli security goals preclude the emergence of sovereign Palestinian governance, whether through electoral legitimacy or international support, they risk institutionalizing a state of permanent liminality for Gaza. The territory becomes neither fully occupied nor fully autonomous, trapped in a carceral gray zone governed by foreign deterrence and humanitarian triage. Such an outcome would not only fail to address the structural roots of conflict but would almost certainly ensure the recurrence of violence in new, unpredictable forms.

Reconciling Israeli security with Palestinian self-determination, therefore, is not merely a logistical or tactical dilemma, it is the defining geopolitical contradiction of the postwar order. Any framework that ignores one in favor of the other is destined to fail, as both are inextricably linked. The problem is not that one side’s needs are illegitimate, but that the frameworks under consideration have consistently privileged control over consent, deterrence over diplomacy. Without a shift in paradigm, from security through domination to security through political settlement, the region will remain trapped in cycles of destruction and deferred responsibility.

Efforts to position the Palestinian Authority as the successor to Hamas in Gaza confront profound structural and political impediments. The PA, long mired in accusations of authoritarianism, corruption, and political stagnation, lacks both a democratic mandate and functional legitimacy among Palestinians in Gaza. Having been expelled from the territory during the Hamas-Fatah split in 2007, the PA’s governing apparatus has no organic institutional presence in the Strip. Moreover, its deep dependence on Israeli coordination in the West Bank, particularly with regard to security cooperation and financial transfers, renders it vulnerable to being perceived as a subcontractor of occupation rather than a credible force for national liberation. Any effort to install the PA in postwar Gaza without meaningful electoral or reconciliation processes would risk reinforcing the narrative of externally imposed governance devoid of popular consent.

Proposals to revitalize the PA in order to make it a plausible governing alternative often amount to little more than bureaucratic window dressing. Western and Arab policymakers have floated technocratic reform packages, cabinet reshuffles, and international financing incentives, but these efforts do not grapple with the root issue, that being the absence of political legitimacy and national unity. Revitalization, if it is to be anything more than rhetorical, would require a negotiated intra-Palestinian political settlement, free and fair elections, and a transformation of the PA’s security doctrine to reflect accountability to the Palestinian public rather than coordination with external actors. It would also require Israeli willingness to cede control over key dimensions of governance in Gaza, a prospect for which there is currently scant evidence. Without these foundational changes, attempts to reintroduce the PA risk creating a new target for public frustration and delegitimization, rather than a durable path to governance.

Parallel to the questions of institutional leadership lies the deeper issue of Gaza’s societal resilience. Nearly two decades of blockade, intermittent war, and economic deprivation have hollowed out civil society institutions and decimated Gaza’s human capital. The current war has only accelerated the collapse of education, healthcare, and local governance infrastructures, while catalyzing the mass displacement of professionals, educators, and civic leaders. This destruction threatens the long-term viability of any future Palestinian administration, not merely in administrative terms, but in the erosion of a functional social fabric capable of supporting democratic norms, civic participation, and development. In this context, the resilience of civil society cannot be presumed; it must be deliberately rebuilt through bottom-up investment, inclusive planning, and long-term international engagement that extends beyond emergency aid.

However, such reconstruction will face formidable obstacles if the political and economic environment remains extractive and punitive. The conditioning of aid on demilitarization, the securitization of reconstruction frameworks, and the exclusion of local actors from decision-making processes threaten to reproduce the dependency structures that have long undermined Gaza’s autonomy. Moreover, any attempt to suppress or sideline Palestinian political agency under the guise of stabilization will only deepen the legitimacy crisis confronting external intervention. Recovery must be framed not merely as the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, but as the reconstitution of political and civic life. Without such a paradigm shift, the postwar Gaza reconstruction discourse risks becoming yet another mechanism for managing Palestinian dispossession rather than reversing it.

The regional and international response to Gaza’s postwar trajectory reveals a complex landscape of conditional engagement and geopolitical triangulation. Arab governments, particularly Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have expressed a willingness to participate in reconstruction efforts, but only under clear conditions. Namely, the establishment of a credible and politically legitimate Palestinian governance framework, and a commitment by Israel to halt unilateral occupationist ambitions. Their reluctance to be seen as underwriting a post-Hamas arrangement that enables further displacement or permanent Israeli military control reflects both domestic political sensitivities and a broader regional consensus that any engagement must be tethered to a long-term solution, ideally grounded in renewed momentum toward Palestinian statehood. This calibrated posture underscores the dissonance between Israel’s near-term strategic objectives and the Arab states’ long-term diplomatic calculus.

At the same time, the United States and European Union find themselves navigating a precarious balance between political solidarity with Israel and the exigencies of post-conflict reconstruction. While Washington continues to back Israel militarily and diplomatically, it faces mounting pressure, both domestically and from regional allies, to articulate a clearer political horizon that addresses Palestinian governance and recovery. European actors, traditionally more vocal about international legal norms and humanitarian imperatives, are constrained by limited leverage and deep internal divisions. Meanwhile, institutions like UNRWA remain essential yet increasingly embattled, caught between expanding humanitarian obligations and intensifying political attacks on their legitimacy. The result is an uneven and often incoherent international approach, one that risks privileging stabilization over justice, and security over sovereignty, thereby perpetuating the very dynamics that have historically undermined durable peace in Gaza.

The challenge of postwar governance in Gaza does not suffer from a lack of proposed solutions; it suffers from a lack of consensus, legitimacy, and feasibility. Among the most frequently cited models are the reinstatement of the Palestinian Authority under international supervision, a temporary Arab-led security force backed by Western funding, or an international trusteeship involving the United Nations and regional stakeholders. Yet each proposal is fraught with political liability. The PA lacks credibility in Gaza, and its capacity to govern without coercion or Israeli oversight is deeply questionable. Arab states, especially Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf monarchies, have signaled reluctance to absorb the political fallout of visibly administering postwar Gaza without a credible pathway to Palestinian sovereignty. Meanwhile, an international trusteeship raises serious concerns about neo-colonial governance structures and would require unprecedented multilateral coordination between parties that often disagree on first principles, including the United States, the European Union, and key Arab capitals.

Any meaningful transition mechanism must address both the material governance of Gaza, security, aid distribution, infrastructure, and the symbolic terrain of legitimacy and national aspiration. Without Palestinian consent and participation, no administrative structure, however well-funded or technically competent, will avoid being perceived as an imposed regime. Moreover, if such an authority is constructed without clear benchmarks toward political resolution, most crucially, reunification with the West Bank and advancement toward statehood, it risks being dismissed by Palestinians as a facade for indefinite occupation or partition. The essential contradiction is that stakeholders capable of managing security and reconstruction, namely Israel, the U.S., and select Arab states, are also those least trusted by the Palestinian population, particularly in Gaza. This legitimacy gap cannot be papered over with technocratic governance or humanitarian aid and must be resolved through a political vision that acknowledges and operationalizes Palestinian self-determination.

At the core of the postwar dilemma is the question of political horizon. What future are regional and global stakeholders envisioning for Gaza, and how explicitly are they willing to articulate it? The status quo ante, marked by Hamas control, Israeli blockade, and intermittent war, is widely recognized as untenable. Yet proposals to simply decapitate Hamas and impose a foreign-backed administration without a roadmap to Palestinian sovereignty signal a continuation, rather than a disruption, of the underlying structural violence. Reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under a revitalized PA has been mentioned in policy circles, but the mechanisms to achieve this, especially without a broader Israeli commitment to a two-state framework, remain elusive. The idea of long-term separation, meanwhile, is gaining quiet traction in some Israeli and American circles, not out of ideological clarity, but as a default path of least resistance. In this scenario, Gaza is permanently cordoned off, administered by a compliant authority, and kept politically and economically fragmented from the West Bank, effectively neutering the possibility of a unified Palestinian polity.

This ambiguity in political vision is not a neutral omission. It constitutes a strategic ambiguity that benefits actors who prefer containment over resolution. By avoiding explicit commitments to Palestinian statehood, stakeholders preserve room to maneuver tactically while deferring the structural conditions that reproduce conflict. Yet history suggests that such ambiguity only forestalls and intensifies eventual crises. If the international community seeks more than conflict management, if it seeks conflict transformation, it must define Gaza’s future not solely in terms of who administers it tomorrow, but in terms of who represents it politically in a decade. Without anchoring the transition in a concrete political endgame, even the most sophisticated governance architecture will be hollow, another scaffolding built atop contested ground, destined to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.

The eventual conclusion of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza does not, in itself, constitute a resolution to the deeper structural and political crises that have long plagued the territory. While battlefield objectives may be achieved, whether in the form of Hamas’s degradation or the establishment of some provisional administrative arrangement, such tactical gains remain unmoored from any coherent or sustainable political horizon. A ceasefire absent a governance plan, reconstruction framework, or diplomatic consensus risks hardening the very instability that the war purportedly aims to extinguish. In short, a military termination without political transformation could well produce a more volatile and fragmented Gaza, primed for the resurgence of militancy and the entrenchment of despair.

At the heart of this dilemma lies a fundamental disconnect between the conduct of war and the requirements of peace. Israel’s refusal to articulate a viable endgame beyond the removal of Hamas has created a vacuum into which contradictory ambitions have poured. Calls for indefinite occupation, temporary international trusteeship, Arab state involvement, and even coerced population transfer. Yet none of these proposals address the core issue of how to restore political legitimacy to Gaza’s governance in a manner that acknowledges both Israeli security imperatives and Palestinian national aspirations. Without a serious reckoning with this dual imperative, postwar stabilization efforts are destined to be piecemeal, externally imposed, and fatally disconnected from the ground realities that will shape Gaza’s future.

Thus, the central challenge is not merely to stop the violence, but to recalibrate the entire framework through which Gaza is governed and understood. If the end state is to be more than a rebranded continuation of the status quo then all stakeholders, from Tel Aviv to Washington, Ramallah to Cairo, must confront the political horizon they are willing to work toward. The absence of a credible path to Palestinian self-determination will not simply delay peace. It will delegitimize any interim governance structure and perpetuate the cycle of collapse and reconstruction. In the end, the durability of any ceasefire depends less on its military enforcement than on the political architecture built, or neglected, in its aftermath.