Recognition and Repercussions: The UK Backs Palestinian Statehood
by Thomas R Ullmann
On the 21st of September Kier Starmer announced that the statehood of Palestine would be officially recognised by the United Kingdom along the 1967 border. This was in tandem with similar announcements in Canada, Australia, and France. So where do the borders of this state lie? Will this have a tangible repercussion on the Israel-Palestine conflict or is it purely symbolic?

A landmark announcement
The Foreign Office press release of 21 September 2025 confirmed that “the UK has formally recognised Palestine to protect the viability of a two-state solution,” timing the move with similar declarations by Canada, Australia and France [1]
Shortly thereafter Prime Minister Keir Starmer told the nation: “To revive the hope of peace and a two-state solution… the United Kingdom formally recognises the State of Palestine.” [2] Reuters noted that London’s decision was coordinated with Ottawa, Canberra and Paris to maximise diplomatic impact before the UN General Assembly opened [3].
Manifesto promise delivered
Labour’s June 2024 manifesto pledged to “recognise a Palestinian state as a contribution to a renewed peace process.” [4]The Labour Party On 29 July 2025, after a year in office, Starmer set a deadline: the UK would act “by September” unless Israel agreed to a Gaza cease-fire and serious talks—effectively turning recognition into leverage [5]. The Netanyahu lead Israeli government ignored this warning, continuing with its offensive in Gaza. In turn Starmer followed through with his promise.
A motivation driven by internal politics?
Sustained pro-Palestinian marches, including hundreds of thousands on London’s streets in November 2023 [6] and still drew large crowds six months later[7], kept grassroots pressure on Labour’s leadership. Days before the UN session, the party’s conference committee ruled out about 30 Palestine-related motions, provoking accusations of “censorship” from the left [8]. Recognition helped quell that dissent and showed the base that manifesto words had meaning.
Pro-Palestinian protests have faced heavy policing whilst the group Palestine Action has been designated as a terrorist group in July 2025[20]. Pro-palestinian protests represent the tip of broader support for Palestinian rights among the left in the UK. As such, and with Starmer suffering in the polls, shoring up unsure Labour support is likely at least part of the motivation behind this policy decision.
From the Green Line to Oslo, the History of the Border
The following outlines the brief snapshot and UN resolutions establishing the pre-1967 border as the legal dilineation between the two eventual states,
- The UN resolution UNSC 242 (1967) turned the pre-4 June 1967 armistice line (known as the Green Line) into the reference point for withdrawal “from territories occupied” [9].
- UNSC 2334 (2016) reaffirmed that post-1967 settlements have “no legal validity,” cementing the Green Line as the legal divider between Israeli and Palestinian jurisdictions [10]. This made the settlements illegal and the Israeli defence of the settlers a legally gray area.
- Oslo Accords (1993–95) set up the Palestinian Authority and envisaged final-status talks on borders—implicitly the 1967 lines [11]. Arguably this was the closest time to long term peace being achieved with the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators known to have form friendships in the process.
- Clinton Parameters (Dec 2000) proposed a Palestinian state on 94–96 % of the West Bank, with Israel annexing settlement blocs that held about 80% of settlers in exchange for 1–3 % land swaps [12].
Three scenarios for Israeli settlements in the West Bank
Scenario | Settlers who stay | Key supporters / precedents | |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Land-swap blocs – Israel annexes the large contiguous blocs (≈ 4–6 % WB) and swaps equal Israeli land | ≈ 80 % | Clinton Parameters [12]; Yesh Atid leader Lapid backs keeping blocs & freezing isolated outposts [14]; Israeli Labour though with more flexible swaps [15] |
2 | Relocation with compensation – dismantle isolated outposts, pay evacuees | ≈ 20 % | Meretz platform calls for an Evacuation–Compensation Law [16]; precedents: Sinai 1982 & Gaza 2005 |
3 | Remain under Palestinian sovereignty – settlers stay as Palestinian residents | Theoretically 100 % | Floated by Netanyahu in 2014 but rejected across the spectrum [18] |
Current estimates put approx. 500 000 settlers in the West Bank plus 220 000 in East Jerusalem [13]
Repercussions
Starmer’s statement spoke of “provisional borders, based on the 1967 lines with equal land swaps,” clearly endorsing Scenario 1 in the table above [2].
Israeli response
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the move: “A Palestinian state will not arise; this will not bind Israel in any way.” [17] Far-right ministers urged immediate annexation of West-Bank territory. It is unclear as to whether or not the currently Israeli government will act with a greater sense of urgency to annex the West-Bank.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York on Friday.
Angela Weiss/AFP/Getty Images
Meanwhile, Yair Lapid of the centralist Yesh Atid party describes the move as a “reward for terror”[20] . In the past he had suggested a blocs-for-freeze formula in order to gain US backing for current settlements [14]. Benny Gantz from National Unity/Blue & White and the former defence minister warned in similar fashion that recognising statehood “ultimately only emboldens Hamas, extends the war, distances the prospects of a hostage deal and sends a clear message of support to Iran and its proxies.” He urged Western leaders to apply “maximum pressure on Hamas… before anything else.” [21]
However, Israeli Labour have long backed a two state solution along 1967 borders. MK Gilad Kariv derided ministers for reacting with memes and annexation threats instead of strategy, tweeting that a “bunch of over-grown babies is running our country,” with no criticism for the UK government [22] Hadash–Ta’al of the Arab-Jewish left welcomed the announcement from the UK [23] . Despite still being behind the opposition parties have experienced a resurgence in the polls with the ruling Likud party on shaky ground [24]
This comes at a time of frequent, often sizeable protests against the government. Anti-government demonstrators blocked the entrance to a Likud holiday toast in Kfar Saba on 20th September 2025, waving hostage portraits and chanting “Elections now” at cabinet ministers. The protest was part of the weekly nationwide rallies that have persisted since mid-2024, demanding a Gaza cease-fire, the release of captives and the resignation of Prime Minister Netanyahu [25].
Does recognising Palestine “reward” Hamas ?
Israeli and Western critics contend that Britain’s decision “gives a huge reward to terrorism,” pointing to Hamas’s 2023 massacre and arguing that recognition hands the Islamist movement a diplomatic victory it has never earned [26] Hamas certainly tried to claim credit, hailing the UK-led announcements as proof that “resistance works” while insisting it would not disarm [27]. Yet London’s position is the opposite: ministers stress that statehood “is not a reward for Hamas” and that the group remains “a vile terrorist organisation” proscribed in its entirety under UK law since 2021 [28] [29].
Legally, recognition extends to the State of Palestine as represented by the PLO-led Palestinian Authority; it does not confer legitimacy on whichever faction currently wields force in Gaza. Indeed, the UN Security Council has repeated that Gaza must be “reunified with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority” as the only acceptable political end-state [30]. In practice Hamas still governs the Strip’s day-to-day affairs, but the diplomatic upgrade strengthens the PA’s claim to be the sole voice of the new state and, in theory, tightens the international cordon around Hamas, which remains isolated, financially sanctioned and excluded from formal peace forums [31]
Why scenario 3 is off the table
Netanyahu’s 2014 “trial balloon” on settlers living under Palestinian rule was swiftly shot down by his own coalition and by Palestinian negotiators citing security fears [18]. Israeli public opinion is coloured by the nearly one million Jews forced from Arab lands after 1948, reinforcing scepticism that a future Palestinian state could protect Jewish minorities [19] with antisemitic sentiment having not receded effectively this would be an act of forced migration despite a theoretical right to remain for the settlers.
Substantive Changes or purely Symbolism?
Recognition deepens Israel’s legal exposure without actually expanding it. Since Palestine had already acceded to the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has claimed jurisdiction over grave crimes committed on its territory; arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, have been left in force by ICC judges in July 2025, thus already rest on that premise and remain unchanged [32]. The United Kingdom’s decision does not widen the Court’s reach, but it does harden the perception that Israeli military action now takes place inside a sovereign state. In any future courtroom or United-Nations debate, Tel Aviv will find it harder to argue that the West Bank and Gaza are merely “disputed territories”; the diplomatic ground has shifted toward viewing them as occupied land belonging to a recognised neighbour.
Whether that shift can translate into a viable Palestinian state is another matter. International recognition on paper does not confer territorial control, economic viability or unified governance. Gaza’s infrastructure is near collapse, unemployment tops sixty-per-cent and the Palestinian Authority’s finances are “on the brink” of insolvency; without a massive stabilisation plan and intra-Palestinian reconciliation, state institutions remain aspirational. Analysts on all sides concede that recognition, unaided by sanctions on settlement expansion or guarantees of Israeli security, risks being little more than a symbolic gesture while being lauded as progress [34].
Still, symbolism can have consequences. Each additional Western capital breaking with Washington’s veto isolates the Israeli government and raises the political cost of further annexation or large-scale operations. Europe is already debating tighter arms-export criteria and conditioning trade preferences on respect for the 1967 lines. In regional terms, Jordan and Egypt see a clearer diplomatic track to end the Gaza war, while Gulf states hint that full normalisation with Israel will depend on meaningful follow-through. None of this guarantees progress, but it recalibrates incentives: the more Israel is viewed as attacking a state its closest allies recognise, the more leverage those allies possess to demand change.
The notion that recognising Palestine as a state somehow rewards Hamas is folly. The recognition of a single state assumes a single government with Hamas having no legitimacy to this claim and remains rightfully denounced as a terrorist organisation by the UK. Conversely the Palestinian Authority could be assumed the natural inheritor of governance over Gaza after its active role in the UN. Nevertheless, with Gaza ravaged by war there is little prospect of near-term elections.

View of destruction in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, January 2025. © 2025 UNRWA Photo by Ashraf Amra
Recognition alone will not conjure a Palestinian state into functional existence, nor is it entirely meaningless. It consolidates legal narratives that favour Palestinian sovereignty, amplifies Israel’s accountability risks and signals the momentum of the diplomatic centre of gravity. Whether that momentum leads to negotiations, or to deeper entrenchment, now depends on what the principal actors do with the leverage the gesture creates.
Bibliography
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[2] Prime Minister’s Office. PM statement on the recognition of Palestine. 21 Sept 2025.
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[5] Wintour, P. UK to recognise Palestinian statehood in September unless Israel agrees ceasefire. The Guardian, 29 Jul 2025.
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[16] Meretz Party. English Platform, Feb 2021, p 34.
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[32] CC judges reject Israel’s request to withdraw Netanyahu arrest warrant, Reuters, 16 Jul 2025.
[33] US House votes to sanction International Criminal Court over Israel, Reuters, 10 Jan 2025.
[34] Justin Salhani, Is recognising Palestine a way to ‘save face’ for Western leaders?, Al Jazeera, 21 Sep 2025.