Syria’s New Dawn Appears Darkly Authoritarian

Syria’s New Dawn Appears Darkly Authoritarian

Thomas R Ullmann

June 22, 2025

Abstract

In December 2024, a lightning rebel offensive culminated in the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, offering hope for a Syria devastated by over a decade of war. Since then, interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has adopted a veneer of inclusive rhetoric, yet the substance of his reforms tells a different story. This article explores the developments under Syria’s new interim government, reflecting upon Syria’s emerging trajectory; including the consequences for women and minorities, as well as future alliances.

A new start

In December 2024, as al-Assad fled to Russia, Syria’s rebel coalition revelled in the raucous cheer of Syrians who had survived barrel bombs, siege, and starvation.

"The tyrant Bashar al-Assad has fled. We declare Damascus liberated." [26] claimed the rebels.

The proclamation was cathartic, yet fragile. The rebels; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Turkish backed Syrian National Army (SNA), the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and southern Free Syrian (FSA) remnants shared only one common plank, Never again Damascus under Assad.

Within seventy-two hours of victory, the clatter of guns returned to the outskirts of Aleppo as SNA and SDF patrols fought over roadblocks. In the capital, HTS’s elite Red Bands secured ministries while the Southern Operations Room, an uneasy confederation of former FSA outfits, argued it had bled for the city and deserved equal say. The revolution’s after party was already cracking with HTS dominating over all other groups.

The interim government, constitution, and judiciary

On 13 March 2025 President al-Sharaa, leader of the HTS, unveiled a forty-four article Constitutional Declaration [1]. Article 1 rebrands the state "Syrian Islamic Republic," signalling the ideological pivot. Article 3, one of the most decisive in determining the legal trajectory, reads in full,

"Islamic jurisprudence (Sharia) shall be the principal source of legislation; no law shall contravene its provisions."

The clause revokes the 2012 constitution’s half-secular compromise and partially echoes Iran’s 1979 text.

Although two-thirds of the People’s Assembly seats are supposed to be chosen through an indirect election overseen by a newly formed Supreme Committee, Article 24 of the 13 March

2025 Constitutional Declaration still lets the president appoint the remaining one-third[27]. A presidential Decree installed an HTS-leaning Supreme Committee whose members now draft the eligibility rules[28, 29].

Given Article 41 simultaneously empowers the president to proclaim an open-ended state of emergency, independent analysts warn that the committee can strike out any nominee it labels "anti-revolutionary," a loophole already criticised by civil-society observers[30, 31]. Human Rights Watch likewise cautions that the whole framework "risks consolidating executive control at the expense of fundamental freedoms."[32]

Whilst reference to human rights is included in the constitution, ambiguity is fostered when Sharia law is considered the principle source of legislation. As such the determining factor will be the appointments to Syria’s new supreme constitutional court and how the constitution will be interpreted.

In the interim the president may legislate by decree "in exigent circumstances," ratify treaties without parliamentary consent, dissolve the People’s Assembly after six months, and hand-pick ten of the Supreme Constitutional Court’s fifteen judges [2]. Ominously, according to the draft constitution of March 2025, the new court will comprise seven members, all to be appointed by President al-Sharaa[15].

Such a collection of power suggests a sensitivity to corruption and a strong proneness to an ideological bent. This change from ten of the fifteen, to all seven judges marks an ever increasing concentration of power around the presidency.

Western observers warned the draft "builds an Islamist republic atop Ba’athist scaffolding," combining Assad-era presidentialism with clerical veto [3, 4]. Turkish officials privately applauded the strong presidency, calculating that al-Sharaa’s dependence on Ankara’s logistics grants Turkey leverage over border security and refugee repatriation.

Several of the most influential ministries including Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Justice are led by individuals with direct ties to HTS, specifically Anas Khattab (Interior), Murhaf Abu Qasra (Defence), Asaad al-Shaibani (Foreign Affairs), and Mazhar al-Wais (Justice) [33].

These appointments ensure that core areas of state power-security, foreign policy (as well as the increased power of the president's hand over the judiciary) remain firmly under the influence of the HTS [34]. As is made clear in the section of this article on how the HTS has governed Idlib this does not bode well for the last remnants of secularism in Syria.

Under article 52 of the constitution Presidential elections are to follow within five years, following a full census and drafting of a permanent constitution [1]. In order to amend the constitution requires a two thirds majority of the People’s Assembly which is significantly influenced by the president and with no genuine oversight. Hence, the scope for scepticism should be maintained, the likelihood of elections in this time frame appears doubtful.

Policing reforms

HTS inherited Assad’s police academies but not his secular syllabus. A ten-day induction now replaces the former nine-month diploma,

• Days 1-3. Fiqh foundations, memorising hadith on the duties of the hisba.
• Days 4-6. Riot drills, crowd herding, detainee triage, and a module on moral infractions: unveiled hair, public smoking during Ramadan, mixed-gender cafés.
• Days 7-10. Ballistics basics, checkpoint vernacular, and a written test on twenty-five Quranic versespass mark 90 %. [35]

Graduates receive a green armband and Glock-17. Desertion is punishable by confiscation of family property, an Ottoman relic revived for discipline.

A longer nine month academy, drafted by Idlib University’s College of Sharia and Law, promises courses in comparative fiqh(Islamic jurisprudence), criminal procedure, evidence, and a practicum in HTS-run courts [6]. Secular lawyers note what is missing: forensics, cyber-crime, or the UN’s Basic Principles on the Use of Force. Human-rights NGOs report the first batch of 600 graduates is already policing Idlib City, handing down on-the-spot lashings for petty theft [7]. It is clear from the syllabus that the police will take on some of the role of morality policing seen in states such as Iran.

There are strong indicators that the interim government is deliberately using Idlib as a template, from police reform to other areas of governance. Economy Minister Basel Abdel Hannan told Reuters the interim authorities are aiming to extend the Idlib model.[51]

Idlib Governance under the HTS

Ahmad al-Sharaa and HTS, while rooted in al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch (Jabhat al-Nusra prior to 2016), have formally severed ties and publicly renounced transnational jihadism-repositioning themselves as a localized Islamist movement focused on governance and national interests. It would thus be unfair to solely judge their current positions and actions based upon their past.

Instead their actions in governance of Idlib province serves as a blueprint for what can be expected from national rule. HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) as a de facto administration managing local governance, education, taxation, and public services.

Sharia law includes explicit reference to punishments such as amputations or stonings yet some of the most severe penalties have not been enacted since 2021 when the last stoning occurred with three women stoned for adultery[16] The SSG has disavowed hudud punishments as of late 2024. However, lashings continued to be a regular form of punishment for alcohol consumption and minor theft. To quote the US commission on International Religious Freedom HTS courts continue to impose discretionary penalties (tazr), including public lashings, often for moral or religious infractions.[17]

Civil disputes in Idlib are adjudicated under a hybrid legal system, in which SSG courts apply a mix of Sharia, remnants of the Ottoman Majalla, the 1949 French-inspired Civil Code, and tribal customary law -a patchwork arrangement that outsiders often describe as chaotic, but which HTS portrays as a deliberate, multi-layered form of legitimacy grounded in local tradition and Islamic jurisprudence [18].

A leaked 128-article "Public Morality Law," obtained by Enab Baladi in January 2024, established a new branch inside Idlib’s Interior Ministry Markaz al-Fal charged with "upholding public virtue" throughout HTS-controlled territory [36].

The Dutch Foreign Ministry’s 2021 country-of-origin report confirms that HTS reorganised its earlier hisba under the same name in May 2020, folding it into the movement’s wider security services [37].

A USCIRF November 2022 factsheet states that Markaz al-Fal patrols enforce Islamic dress codes, gender segregation, and Ramadan observance, with authority to arrest and detain violators [38].

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) documents recent cases in which the morality police detained women for "inappropriate" dress and journalists critical of HTS, highlighting the unit’s role in social control rather than conventional policing [39].

Indeed, women’s mobility in Idlib is still constrained by a de-facto male-guardianship (mahram) regime. The EU Agency for Asylum recorded that in some parts of Idlib women and girls were required to be accompanied by a male guardian (mahram) and that HTS checkpoints vet female passengers for compliance[21]. A draft Public Morality Law leaked in January 2024 would formalise this rule: Article 16 prohibits gender mixing in public except with proof of mahram and mandates a specialised Morality Police to detain violators[22].

Field reporting from October 2021 documents Hisbah patrols that detained a woman and a shop keeper because she was "inside the shop alone, without a mahram," and publicly reprimanded another woman in Idlib Park over "eye-catching" dress[23].

USCIRF’s 2022 factsheet likewise notes that Markaz al-Falah, HTS’s morality force, arrests women for being "inappropriately dressed" or for moving about without a guardian[38]. Zelin's 2022 study, citing UN Commission of Inquiry case files, lists repeated incidents, including June 2017 assaults in the Idlib city market, where women were beaten, flogged, or imprisoned for travelling without a mahram[25].

Taken together these sources show that, although the guardianship rule is not yet enshrined in a promulgated statute, it is routinely enforced through moral-police patrols; punishments range from verbal humiliation and fines to short-term detention and, in documented cases, corporal violence.

This year women’s activist Ghalia Rahhal in reference to how women were marginalized under the HTS in Idlib stated In general, I don’t trust HTS because I still don't know whether they are truly changing or they just claim to have changed, she said. Are they really changing ideologically, or just for their own interests?[14]

Meanwhile Syria itself steps towards the Idlib model with HTS authorities having issued a decree requiring women on public beaches and pools to wear full-body swimwear (e.g. burkinis). The Ministry of Tourism frames these rules as measures to respect "public morals and cultural values."

Media and civil society clampdown

On 9 April 2025 the interim government passed a "Public Information Purity Law" criminalising "false or harmful portrayal of Islamic governance." The law fines foreign reporters US$20 000 per infraction and obliges local outlets to employ a certified sharia reviewer. Reporters Without Borders now ranks Syria 178/180 on its 2025 Press Freedom Index [11]. Popular satirist Maher al-Tahan disappeared after mocking HTS interior minister Ali al-Jassem on Telegram. Graffiti of a gagged cartoon crow-the new symbol of censored speech-adorns Homs back-alleys; HTS paints it over each dawn, only for the bird to re-emerge by dusk.

Civil society groups face a bureaucratic licence maze: registration at the Ministry of Endowments, yearly loyalty audit, and a clerical board seat for "moral oversight." Women’s literacy NGO Noura closed after clerics demanded segregated classrooms with opaque partitions. An Amnesty field report lists 127 activists detained between February and May 2025 [12].

Political transition and inclusion

The March 2025 "National Dialogue" convened 148 delegates in the shuttered People’s Assembly hall. Assad-era Baathists and the SDF’s Autonomous Administration were uninvited. Twenty four seats went to HTS clerics, ten to Ankara-vetted technocrats, and eight were reserved for "patriotic minorities"-a Druze hotelier, two Syriac doctors, a sole Alawite sheikh.

With the main ministries firmly under HTS control the handful of non-HTS examples of non HTS ministers are the Druze tourism minister presiding over cratered heritage sites; two Chris tian deputies administer health and telecoms, portfolios without budgets. Additionally, the new electoral law requires candidates to swear allegiance to Sharia and "the sacrifices of the jihad."

Meanwhile a March 2025 EUAA country-focus report records that Druze villages in Suwayda formed a separate "Military Council" after at least seventy property seizures and over fifty kidnappings allegedly carried out by HTS-linked security units, warning of rising "sectarian violence and forced conversion pressures."[41] On 2 May 2025 Reuters reported that Sunni Islamist militants stormed the Druze village of al-Soura al-Kubra, killing a dozen civilians and prompting an emergency army deployment,an episode local elders said showed "HTSs contempt for Druze autonomy."[42] The 2025 Open Doors World Watch List further notes that in HTS-run Idlib and western Aleppo, Christians face bans on church bells, public worship, and rebuilding of damaged sanctuaries, calling the northwest "Syria's most dangerous zone for historic churches."[43]

Kurdish-led authorities in northeast Syria remain in control of approximately 25% of the country's territory and are negotiating with Damascus to secure decentralised governance, including the right to teach Kurdish in schools and celebrate Nowruz (kurdish new year) openly [45, 46]. This was strictly forbidden under the Assad regime with many Kurds unable to read their own language.

So far HTS’s response to Kurdish calls for federalism is to redraw districts, diluting Kurdish votes with SNA-held Arab villages.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime, Turkish-backed forces, including the Syrian National Army, have captured key Kurdish-held towns such as Manbij and Tel Rifaat, displacing over 100,000 Kurdish civilians [47, 45]. As of 10th March an agreement between interim President al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi commits to integrating much of the SDF into state institutions by year-end, alongside control of border crossings and oilfields [48, 49].

However, Kurdish protests erupted in Qamishli on 14th March over the constitutional declaration, as demonstrators complained it failed to guarantee minority rights or federalism, demanding "democratic and federal" reforms.

Overall minorities face an increasingly uncertain future in Syria with actions rarely matching verbal assurances.

Comparative analysis: Similarities with Iran?

Iran’s revolution offers a disquieting mirror. Both states adopted constitutions naming Sharia the chief legislative font and empowering revolutionary guards to "protect the revolution." In deed, like in Syria the revolutionaries were a broad coalition before the islamists marginalised and punished the other factions.[44]

However, Syria lacks Iran’s single faqih (an Islamic jurist). Instead, HTS’s Central Sharia Council, a ten-man college, vets laws and presidential decrees. This appears closer to Qatar’s Council of Senior Scholars in model.

Whilst Egypt’s 2014 charter speaks of principles of Sharia, Coptic Christians still head courts. Morocco’s constitution subordinates clergy to a monarch styled "Commander of the Faithful."

Syria’s experiment is harsher than all but the Iranian example. Clerics wield veto power without a monarch’s moderating prestige. The final form of Syria’s theocratic authoritarianism looks to fall somewhere between the Qatari and Iran’s theocracy though could tend towards Afghanistan’s raw Emirate.

Economic and Humanitarian Fallout

Victory did not stop the bleeding economy. The Syrian pound (SYP), trading at SYP 14 000 per US dollar under Assad, crashed to SYP 21 500 by May 2025. The IMF’s Staff Monitor Report warns hyper-inflation could top 700 % by year-end [9]. Basic staples-bulgur (a grain similar to couscous), lentils, and diesel-are priced in Turkish lira to dodge the spiral, binding northern Syria’s economy to Ankara.

Humanitarian agencies register 680 000 newly displaced since January 2025, chiefly minorities fearing Islamisation [10]. Bread lines snake past shuttered bakeries; diesel rationing limits hospital generators to four hours per day. Doctors Without Borders reports paediatric malnutrition in Idlib at 14 %, the highest since 2016. Yet al-Sharaa’s cabinet slashed UN cooperation, accusing Western NGOs of "cultural sabotage."

Outlook and Implications

Absent external shocks, Syria is drifting toward an Islamist-authoritarian hybrid. A presidential strongman fenced by clerical review, elections filtered through loyalty vetting, and law enforced by a policing caste trained more in fiqh than forensics. Western sanctions may fragment, Brussels debates limited reconstruction funds should refugees return but Washington’s sanctions framework endures.

Whilst the west hesitates to engage with an emerging authoritarian state, Turkey sees a buffer against both Kurdish ambitions and Iranian influence; Qatar spots a frontier market for its sovereign-wealth billions. In its vulnerability, Syria could quite easily fall into a dependency with these states in return for alliance. Furthermore, the strongman figure may appeal to RecepErdoan, the Turkish president.

Iran now weakened by war with both Israel and the US whilst nursing proxy militias near Aleppo, eyes the Sunni ascendancy warily. Iran and Syria are natural foes with the new Syrian regime maintaining silence, apparently refusing to condemn the attacks on Iranian soil. Little is also said that Israeli jets are routinely flying over Syrian airspace.

Israel, ever pragmatic, will tolerate the new regime so long as rockets stay clear of the Golan heights. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu has signalled that normalisation is contingent on Syria refraining from any support for Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Israel currently occupies western regions of Syria with Syria demanding withdrawal. If Israel was to appear vulnerable, and Syria forges alliances with Qatar and Turkey a harder line against Israel would become a lot more probable.

Quietly Russia continues to supply arms and maintain military cooperation with Syria. Moscow is negotiating to retain its strategic air and naval bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, offering ongoing deliveries of hardware and diplomatic support.[50]. It is this possible alliance that would ensure a wedge between Syria and western nations.

Meanwhile 25 million Syrians confront soaring food prices, medics ration diesel, and comedians paint mute crows on ruined walls, representing the suppression of free speech. The revolution promised dawn yet the sun has yet to rise.

Should a judiciary stacked with wartime clerics define Syria’s future, the post-Assad dusk may prove longer and darker than the night it replaced.

Meanwhile Syria awaits its first ever free and fair election.

References

[1] Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Islamic Republic (English tr.). 13 March 2025.

[2] Human Rights Watch. Syria: Constitutional Declaration Risks Endangering Rights. 25 March 2025.

[3] Associated Press. Syrian leader signs constitution that puts the country under an Islamist group's rule for five years. 13 March 2025.

[4] Reuters. Syria retains Islamic jurisprudence as the main basis of law, preserves freedoms. 13 March 2025.

[5] Reuters. Syria's new leaders turn to Islamic law in an effort to rebuild Assad's police. 23 January 2025.

[6] Idlib University. College of Sharia and Law Prospectus. 2024.

[7] International Crisis Group. Hybrid Theocracy: Governance and Justice in HTS-Controlled Idlib. Report 235, December 2024.

[8] European University Institute. Tribal Justice, Struggle and Resilience in Syria. Seminar proceedings, 20242025.

[9] International Monetary Fund. Syrian Arab Republic Staff Monitor Report. January 2025.

[10] UN OCHA. Flash Update 3 Mass Displacement Following December 2024 Power Shift. 7 January 2025.

[11] Reporters Without Borders. 2025 World Press Freedom Index Syria Country File. April 2025.

[12] Amnesty International. Dissent Behind Bars: Crackdown on Civil Society in Post-War Syria. May 2025.

[13] Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook: Syria.

[14] "We've proved we can do anything: the Syrian women who want a say in running the country" The Guardian. Sun 5 Jan 2025

[15] Human Rights Watch, Syria: Constitutional Declaration Risks Endangering Rights, 25 Mar. 2025.

[16] The New Arab Syrian Islamist militant group ’publicly stones three women to death’ in Idlib 30 March 2021

[17] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Religious Freedom in Syria Under Hayat Tahrir alSham (HTS), factsheet, Nov.

[18] International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), Rule of law Law Assessment: Syria 2021, noting the melding of Sharia, Ottoman, French and tribal legal sources in SSG courts.

[19] The Nature of Syria's Civil Code, Syria.law, describing Syria's 1949 French-inspired civil code and Ottoman Majalla heritage.

[20] Family law in Syria: a plurality of laws, norms, and legal practices, Leiden University (2024), highlighting the mix of Ottoman, French, Egyptian, and religious law.

[21] European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Syria: Situation of Women Country of Origin Information Report, February 2020.

[22] Enab Baladi, Enab Baladi publishes details from Idlibs Public Morality draft law, 4 January 2024.

[23] Z. Masri, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham guards virtue by imposing restrictions on women in Syria's Idlib, Enab Baladi (English), 24 October 2021.

[24] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Religious Freedom in Syria Under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Factsheet, November 2022.

[25] A. Y. Zelin, The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Policy Focus 175, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 2022, pp. 4547.

[26] The Guardian. (2024, December 8). Syrian Opposition Declares Damascus Liberated as Assad Flees

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[30] Kilpatrick, F., Syria's Constitutional Declaration, Next Century Foundation blog, 24 Mar 2025.

[31] The New Arab, Syria Forms Elections Committee for Peoples Assembly amid Calls for Transparency, 16 Jun 2025.

[32] Human Rights Watch, Syria: Constitutional Declaration Risks Endangering Rights, 25 Mar 2025.

[33] Wikipedia contributors, Syrian transitional government, Wikipedia, retrieved 22 June 2025; lists Anas Khattab, Murhaf Abu Qasra, Asaad alShaibani, and Mazhar alWais as HTS affiliated ministers.

[34] Cathrin Schaer, How inclusive is Syria's new technocratic cabinet?, DW, 31March2025

[35] Reuters, Syria's new leaders turn to Islamic law in effort to rebuild Assad's police, 23 January 2025.

[36] Enab Baladi. Enab Baladi publishes details from Idlib's Public Morality draft law. 4 January 2024

[37] Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Country of Origin Information Report: Syria. June 2021, p. 82 (note 770).

[38] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Religious Freedom in Syria under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Factsheet. November 2022.

[39] Institute for the Study of War. Iran Update, 9 December 2024 (section on HTS morality police detentions). 9 December 2024.

[40] Reuters, Syria requires women to wear burkinis on public beaches, 11 June 2025.

[41] European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), COI Report Syria: Country Focus, March 2025, section 1.3.4 Other religious and ethnic minorities.

[42] Reuters, "Islamist militants clash with Druze fighters in Sweida province," 2 May 2025.

[43] Open Doors International, World Watch List 2025 Syria: Media Advocacy Dossier, March 2025,

[44] Institute for Global Change, Ideology and Iran's Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World, noting that the Islamic Revolution began as a coalition of secular liberals, nationalists, communists and Islamist-Marxists before Islamists marginalized them, 2018.

[45] Associated Press. Kurds in the new Syria want to preserve the cultural rights they gained in years of war. 9 February 2025.

[46] Associated Press. USbacked commander says his Kurdishled group wants a secular and civil state in postAssad Syria. 2 February 2025.

[47] Reuters. Syrian rebels enter northern city of Manbij, Turkish source says. 8 December 2024. [48] Wikipedia contributors. East Aleppo offensive (20242025). Retrieved June 22 2025.

[49] Associated Press. Kurdish fighters leave the northern city in Syria as part of a deal with the central government. 2025.

[50] Kyiv Independent " Syrian leader signals continued military cooperation with Moscow." May 2025.

[51] Reuters, Syria's Islamist rulers overhaul economy with firings, privatization of state firms 31 Jan 2025.