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The Current State of the Chinese Space Sector

by Elendacil

Long March 9 Static Fire (Image Credit: Landscape)

Intro


Earlier this year I gave a tour of one of Blue Origin’s manufacturing facilities to a small group. A member of the group brought up competition with the Chinese space industry and broadly asserted that their efforts would always trail the U.S., and that their innovation was, is, and that their innovation has been, and will continue to be, mere ‘copying’ from the U.S. and other western space sectors. This take is one that I see frequently among people here in the United States and it is apparent that neither the current scope and ambitions of the CCP’s space development is known and/or understood. Instead, the stereotype of uninnovative, low-skill copycats remains prevalent. These assumptions are not only baseless, but the current climate of the Chinese space sector is that of rapid advancement and consolidation—now on course to match, challenge, and eventually exceed U.S. dominance in space.

 

China’s Ideological Drive for Development in Space

 

Key to understanding China’s current and future landscape in regard to their space sector is an understanding of what has developed and shaped their past and present policies in that regard. I often see two default assumptions made about the Chinese system, first being the imposition of one's own ideological framework to understand their decision-making process, and the second being an imagined framework, with little attachment to reality, being imposed on the Chinese system. This second type of assumption includes ideas such as that the Chinese “just copy” or are incapable of developing innovative institutions. Either approach leaves observers unable to accurately gauge China’s actions or intentions.

 

In Dr. Kevin Rudd’s lecture last year at the U.S. National War College on the linkage between CCP ideology and the nation's understanding and implementation of deterrence he addressed this concept that I will quote at length: 

 

Any comprehensive understanding of contemporary Chinese concepts of deterrence must be anchored within the CCP’s overarching Marxist-Leninist ideological and analytical framework of historical materialism and dialectical materialism. This may seem arcane to a modern American audience. But this is a problem of “projectionism”. We should not simply assume that Beijing is driven purely by hard-baked doctrines of strategic realism in which deterrence is just one of realism’s subsets… 
Furthermore, while ideological worldviews and analytical methodologies have always loomed large within the CCP political firmament, under Xi Jinping there has been an even deeper ideological revival. Marxist dialectics have been the subject of multiple politburo and other leadership study sessions. Indeed, Xi has become the most ideologically driven Chinese leader since Mao. This is reflected in the sheer volume of ideological corpus when compared with any of his post-Mao predecessors.
There is still a tendency in the U.S. and the rest of the West to simply write off all this ideology as largely an exercise in political formalism – i.e. it’s what the CCP “needs to say” to justify its raison d’être, rather than providing a real-world guide to policy behaviour in the practical affairs of the Chinese state.
I have a different view. Over Xi’s decade in office, I argue he has deliberately set out to make the CCP and the country at large more Marxist, more Leninist and more nationalist. Furthermore, I argue there is a strong correlation over the same period of time between ideological change and real-world policy and behavioural change – both domestically and internationally. That is not to say that Marxism-Leninism is the only driver of change under Xi. There are of course many. But it is to say that ideology is a significant, albeit not exclusive, factor in Xi’s underlying belief systems. Both as an analytical device for understanding domestic and international reality, and as a shaping dynamic in the real world of policy.
Furthermore, if the Chinese system, for its own reasons, now places greater emphasis on ideology than at any time since the end of the Cultural Revolution, then so should we as we seek to understand current Chinese strategic perceptions. [1]

 

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, China has viewed the United States as the “principal contradiction” to its vision of its place and role in the world [1]. The economic drive for domination in space is real and present, but that is also tied to the fundamental belief that they should be the dominant force in space, and the world. This belief has driven a pragmatic build-out of facilities, institutions, and partnerships for the development of their space infrastructure with the sole motivation of the new wave of space expansion and development to be under CCP party control or influence. 

 

Internal Buildup of Institutions and Capabilities


Since its founding, the CCP has declared its intent to become a dominant space power and has pursued that goal aggressively since the 1950’s, with Mao declaring that “We too, must work on artificial satellites” [2]. The significance of Earth’s orbits and particularly the Moon have been increasing significantly over the past decade and continues to grow in both commercial and strategic importance. This new frontier’s closest analogue is the Age of Exploration of the 15th to 17th century, an era marked with the rise and fall of empires and the mad dash to establish dominance over the “new” lands being discovered. 


Figure 1: Plot of Chinese investment in space sector broken down by type and funding source [2]

 

In 2012, the new General Secretary of the CCP, Xi Jinping, declared the “Space Dream”. This was the beginning of an initiative to develop the Chinese space industry and build China into a “great power” by 2049. Since then, China’s space sector funding has steadily grown with a nearly 2 billion USD increase in funding from 2015 to 2024 (see Figure 1). While the changes from 2012 to now have been immense in the Chinese space industry, the largest and most impactful shift has been the allowance of private capital investment in their space sector in 2024. This enabled two things to happen, first, a new funding source; second—and more importantly, the establishment of an integrated “innovation network” between industry, academia, and government that is reminiscent of the American Manhattan Project.

 

The Commercial Space Federation’s CSF-Redshift report outlines the three-phase plan for space development put out by the China National Space administration in 2024 as follows [2]: 

 

Phase One: Up to 2027

Phase Two: 2028-2035

Phase Three: 2036-2050

 

Phase one of their plan has met most of their goals and their “landmark” mission for a moon landing is meeting the program's deadlines as demonstrated with their recent Long March 10 rocket and Lanyue lander demonstrations [4]. Integral to both the first and second phase are a network of manufacturing, academia, government agency, and private investment of the space industry. This network is already substantially built (see Figure 2) and has allowed a system of discipline overlap to develop. For example, Xi’an is home to the primary satellite control facility in China, the Xi’an National Civil Aviation Aerospace Industrial Base with three aerospace industrial zones and ten industrial parks, and two premier academic research institutions (Xi’an Jiaotong and Northwestern Polytechnical University) are located near these government and industrial centers. These overlapping sectors, replicated across China, have enabled rapid innovation and build-out cycles.

Figure 2: Breakdown of the Chinese space sector geographically. It is important to note how government, academic institutions, industrial sites, and private enterprise are grouped to allow better interconnectivity. [2]


This buildout has led to a steady growth in orbital launches over the past 10 years (see Figure 3) and has led to the current number of operational Chinese spacecraft exceeding to over a thousand [2]. The U.S. has also seen a major ramp up in launches, particularly over the last 5 years almost entirely due to Falcon 9 launches [3]. Orbital launches are just one metric in many for judging a national space program, but as an orbital launch is the culmination of many components it is a good quantitative metric to gauge a nation’s ability to manufacture and maintain orbital infrastructure. Based on that metric both China and the United States seem to be on a steady growth in orbital launch capability.

  

Figure 3: Plot of American and Chinese orbital launches. Over a 9-year period the launch cadence of China has more than tripled. The American launch cadence has increased more than sevenfold over the same period. [3]

 

Coupled with the increase in raw launches is the expansion of Chinese orbital capabilities. As of 2025 China has over 1100 operational spacecraft (rising 25% this year) and over 9600 operational satellites maintained by the United States (with SpaceX’s Starling accounting for over 8300 of those) [5]. China has begun to deploy their own constellation networks with their Qianfan network showing a target of 600 satellites by the end of 2025, and a target of 14,000 satellites for the completed network [6]. Another network, Guowang, has increased its operational count to over 100 with deployment rates expected to increase due to a new government initiative to fast track the program [2]. This coupled with their new space station, Tiangong, represents their intent and progress towards a space program that shifts more global dependence on China for in-space infrastructure.

 

The International Focus


Under the all-encompassing and strategically ambiguous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) the CCP has been expanding its global influence in the space domain through what they call the “Space Silk Road” (SIC). Like other BRI projects, Chinese space infrastructure deals with other nations involve exporting surplus capacity and seeks to build reliance among partner nations on Chinese technology. As seen in Figure 4, there has been significant development in South America, Africa, and southeast Asia. Foremost in that development has been ground stations and satellite sales to participating nations. The ground stations in particular are of the most strategic importance to the CCP as their policy of “dual use” technology (that is, civilian technology built for dual-use purposes for military use if needed) gives them locations around the world to network with their orbital vehicles [2].

 

Figure 4: Current participants in China’s “Space Silk Road”, a component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Most important to note are the ground stations that have been built throughout Africa and South America. [2]

 

In furtherance of their goals of greater international dominance of the space sector to combat the current U.S lead, China has formed the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) as a counter to the Artemis Accords (See Figure 5). Its function can be seen in a similar way BRICS was made to counter the G7. ILRS was initially formed between China and Russia to jointly develop a fully operational lunar research station by 2035. Its rationale for avoiding the Artemis Accords rests primarily on concerns about resource extraction and what it calls “American hegemonic leadership” [2]. All in all, China’s international attitude towards space development can be seen as ambitions for the hegemonic dominance over space they claim the United States have.


Figure 5: Global map showing the signatories of the Artemis Accords (blue) and the ILRS (red). [2]


What should be the American response?


The Redshift strategic report from the Commercial Space Federation offers a series of 21 recommendations to address America’s lethargic response to China’s ambition to “pull ahead” in the new space race. A summary of their recommendations can be seen in Table 1. While a more detailed breakdown of the report’s recommendations is warranted for this discussion; the common thread across the deficiencies the report highlights and offers corrective action for is a general inability by past and especially current U.S governance to commit to long-term strategies and to smooth and encourage commercial, academic and governmental cooperation for space programs. For example, consider the recommendation to modernize and reform the regulatory environment around launching and reentree. Currently, the FAA regulates launch and reentry, the Department of Commerce (DoC) regulates remote sensing, the FCC and DoC both regulate EM spectrum management, the FCC again for in-space collision and space debris, and the State Department and DoC both cover export controls. This current spiderweb of agency overlap and compartmentalization has led to overly long development, mission approval and resulted in a more unsafe environment leading to delays and safety gaps [8]. 


Table 1: Redshift Summary of Recommendations for U.S. Space Sector [2]

Spaceports and Infrastructure:

Satellite Communications and Positioning, Navigation, and Timing:

Provide Federal investment in spaceports through grants

Allocate sufficient spectrum for satellite operations

Streamline Federal and State environmental reviews

Reform Federal spectrum coordination processes

Reform regulations to enable inland vertical launch and orbital reentry operations

Ensure U.S. communication accessibility programs are technology neutral

Commercial LEO

Space Exploration

Fully utilize the ISS through end of life

Fully utilize commercial capabilities to achieve NASA’s Moon to Mars Exploration and Science Objectives.

Foster a smooth transition from ISS to commercial LEO stations and research facilities

Partner with commercial space to enable space science

Continue robust NASA human operations in LEO post-ISS

Implement a mission authorization process that facilitates commercial space exploration missions.

Launch and Re-Entry:

Remote Sensing and Space Situational Awareness:

Streamline commercial launch/reentry licensing

Reform U.S. export controls

Reform environmental reviews for launch/ reentry operations

Reform commercial remote sensing licensing

Provide appropriate resources to improve launch/reentry licensing

The U.S. government should utilize commercial data and services to the maximum extent practicable

Reform export controls to increase international collaboration

Support the TraCSS Program and distribute basic SSA data free of charge to the end user

Modernize the management of airspace during

launch/reentry operations



The current American administration has been embroiled in a government shutdown since October 1st, NASA Administrator Sean Duffy is also serving as Acting Secretary of Transportation, and Congress seems more interested in getting an old space shuttle from the Smithsonian to Texas [7] than what’s going over their heads. The current indecision and paralysis of the federal government is creating an environment that is hard for their commercial partners and private investors to plan for the long term. Currently, the United States still maintains a lead in in-space infrastructure, technology, and global partnerships, but as time goes by China has demonstrated the intent and ability to not only reach parity with American technology and in-space presence, but to shift the reins of leadership into their hands.


Sources

 

[1] - The Interrelationship Between CCP Ideology, Strategy and Deterrence | Dr. Kevin Rudd. https://usa.embassy.gov.au/ndu24

 

[2] - CSF-Redshift The Acceleration of China's Commercial and Civil Space Enterprises and The Challenges To America | Commercial Space Federation. https://commercialspace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/CSF-Redshift-v6.pdf

 

[3] - Krebs, Gunter D. “Chronology of Space Launches”. Gunter's Space Page. Retrieved October 13, 2025, from https://space.skyrocket.de/directories/chronology.htm

 

[4] - China is making serious progress in its goal to land astronauts on the moon by 2030 By Leonard David published August 27, 2025 https://www.space.com/astronomy/moon/china-is-making-serious-progress-in-its-goal-to-land-astronauts-on-the-moon-by-2030 

 

[5] - Survey Says Orbital Traffic Surges: 13,026 Active Satellites as of Oct. 1, a 23% Y-O-Y Increase  https://www.tradeandindustrydev.com/industry/aerospace-defense/survey-says-orbital-traffic-surges-13026-active-35036

 

[6] - China launches fourth batch of Thousand Sails megaconstellation satellites by Andrew Jones January 23, 2025 https://spacenews.com/china-launches-fourth-batch-of-thousand-sails-megaconstellation-satellites/

 

[7] - Texas lawmakers double down on Discovery, call for DOJ investigation into Smithsonian  https://arstechnica.com/space/2025/10/texas-lawmakers-double-down-on-discovery-call-for-doj-investigation-into-smithsonian/

[8]- ASTRA: An American Space Transformation Regulatory Act https://fas.org/publication/american-space-transformation-regulatory-act/