Policy Initiatives and Lessions From the CCC

In the current discourse surrounding the crafting and creation of policy to address the swarm of immediate and institutional concerns, there is a common flaw that permeates the ecosystem. The policy space is congested with proposals and thought experiments that are narrow in scope and technocratic in presentation. In effect, policymakers are isolating problems to be solved one at a time, ignoring the interrelated nature of many sets of issues, and failing to execute effective solutions. This makes policy confusing and overwhelming to the public due to sheer volume. This is most egregious when addressing issues of low public interest or with long term return on investments (ROI)— a great example being the discourse around EV charging stations. The policy discourse needs to refocus on the creation of viable policy initiatives. A policy initiative for the purposes of this article is a series of policies, measures, and actions to achieve an overarching series of objectives. Policy initiatives are not an entire national platform; they are the main components executing a national platform. They are multi-layered, broad in scope, and address multiple interrelated issues. Good policy initiatives can be marketed differently to different audiences without damaging legitimacy. Where this is particularly vital is in untangling the quagmire of addressing the immediate needs of the public as well as reforms that are boringly bureaucratic, unpopular, or have long ROI timelines. The current popular methods to address these bifurcated needs are to address each separately. In stark contrast with America's legacy— our most successful and celebrated programs chose to operate under the definition of a policy initiative. Of these, the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) is arguably the best archetype of a successful and deeply transformative policy initiative. 

The Domestic and Popular Front

“Our greatest primary task is to put people to work. This is no unsolvable problem if we face it wisely and courageously. It can be accomplished in part by direct recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would treat the emergency of war, but at the same time, through this employment, accomplishing greatly needed projects to stimulate and reorganize the use of our natural resources.” - Franklin D. Roosevelt  in his 1933 inaugural address ^[1]

It is crucial to highlight the landscape in which the CCC was founded: it was conceived, marketed and operated as an emergency response to the mass unemployment, family destitution, and national resource catastrophes (deforestation, soil exhaustion, the Dust Bowl) of the Great Depression. These were visible, genuine, and urgent issues that the CCC sought to immediately address, and its material success made the program politically untouchable for almost a decade. By the end of the program's nine years, three million young men had rotated through CCC camps. At its peak in 1935, it enrolled more than 500,000 men simultaneously in 2,650 camps. Each enrollee earned $30 per month, of which $25 was sent directly to a family dependent, effectively making the CCC a compulsory family-remittance program operating at national scale ^[2].

1941 polling data shows that the program was immensely popular— roughly 90% approval for the CCC ^[2]. This popularity and public affection garnered from the immediate relief allowed the program to survive FDR's 1935 attempt to reduce the program by around 40% in an attempt to cut spending going into an election year. Congressional Democrats openly revolted, even engaging in joint action with Republicans to counter the cuts. This backlash forced FDR's retreat, and the program continued as usual. This political resilience to interference by even a politician as apt as FDR is striking and shows how popular the program was to the public ^[4]. This resilience allowed the CCC to continue operating until 1942, closing operations as the U.S entrance into WW2 mobilized the nation. The longevity allowed the CCC to not only provide relief, but also to prepare the nation for the demands of wartime mass mobilization. 

The Rearmament and Military Preparedness

The CCC delivered as advertised, but it also played a significant role in preparing the United States Army for war. At the time of the program’s conception, the Isolationist movement in the United States was in full swing. This public sentiment resulted in the US Army's significant degradation by the mid-1930’s. In a mechanizing world, the U.S. Army still mostly moved on foot, deployed obsolete WW1 tank models, and, in June of 1934, had only eighty semiautomatic rifles ^[5]. In a world mobilizing to meet the rapid rise of fascist expansionism, Isolationism prevented American preparatory action. Even FDR was forced to sign the Neutrality Act of 1935 which dramatically reduced America’s ability to engage in preventative actions in the lead-up to WW2 ^[5]. This constraint required a creative solution— that solution was the CCC. 

The only organization capable of mobilizing hundreds of thousands in the requisite timescale was the US Army. The US Forest and Park service did not have the manpower, bureaucracy, or experience managing that many people, and building that out would have taken years. In the spring of 1933, the Quartermaster Corps of the US Army mobilized to provide nearly 300,000 men with food, clothing, equipment, and shelter, as well as transport them across the country within the first three months of the CCC's operation. That is almost three times the personnel than the army, itself, had at the time. The rapid construction of thousands of camps, millions of purchases of clothing and equipment, and nationwide distribution pushed the Quartermaster Cops to its limits ^[6]. The logistical experience and infrastructure the Army gained throughout the CCC’s operation served as the foundation for providing for 12 million servicemembers during WW2. The physical infrastructure of the camps were also repurposed; when war broke out, over 1300 closed camps with buildings and equipment were immediately at the disposal of the armed services. These camps became training schools, housing, and POW camps ^[1]. The CCC saved an atrophying logistics apparatus and allowed it to build badly needed skills, institutions, and experience that were vital in the war.  

The effect on Army personnel was profound. The CCC acted as a rescue measure for the Army Reserve officer corps by having them run the bureaucracy of the CCC. The interwar isolationist environment had led to the gutting of training and funding for the Reserve Officer Corps, leaving its infrastructure available to be repurposed for CCC operations. General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff in WW2, was in command of the CCC’s Vancouver barracks from 1996-1938 which allowed him to experiment with brigade scale command and administration protocols. This hands-on experience was vital for Marshall’s ability to direct the entire Army mobilization of WW2 ^[7]. This experience pipeline was not exclusive to the officer and leadership of the Army but also influenced general personnel. 3 million young men passed through the program and they would become the foundation of the mobilization efforts in 1942 ^[2]. The CCC vocational training program trained members in skills like motor and aviation repair, cooking and baking, clerical skills, radio operation, driving, photography and cartography. These were non-combatant skills the Army would need at scale ^[1]. The 1942 final report by the CCC director showed that in fiscal year 1941 alone, 84% of CCC enrollees had moved to the armed services and defense work ^[1]. 

The Integrated Program

The CCC demonstrated that in the face of a national crisis measures could be taken to address immediate popular needs, as well as long term and unpopular institutional needs. While providing job relief, financial aid to families,and land topsoil restoration, the CCC worked against the sentiment of the times, preserved Army institutions, and prepared millions of Army-conditioned men. The CCC’s militarization was inadvertent at the level of formal training and inevitable at the level of structural conditioning. This organic synthesis of public and institutional needs is what allowed the program to succeed. 

“From tree soldiers to real soldiers. ... Although officially not military camps, CCC camps were run much like a military camp. ... The CCC never formally became a war-training facility, but effectively served as one.” ^[2]

We can draw three clear lessons from the CCC about what makes an effective policy initiative.

1. The popular mission must be real and immediate. The CCC’s work relief and conservation work were not an excuse to expand the Army. They were responses to real emergencies that needed to be dealt with quickly. The deliverables shown in Table 1 are not propaganda points to justify a military build up; they were real and celebrated deliverables on promised relief. This material relief created political resilience that allowed the CCC to survive long enough for the Army’s institutions to weather the period of isolationism. A policy initiative where the popular mission only exists as window trappings for an institutional reform will not generate the political resilience necessary for long ROI reforms to be achievable. 
2. The institutional mission must be administratively compatible with delivering on the popular needs. The Army was not shoehorned into the position of CCC administration. It was the only institution that could deliver at the requisite scale the logistical and administrative capacities to roll out the CC immediately. The interwar remediation was not the primary driver for its integration; it accompanied the organic forces that drove the use of the Army. A policy initiative needs to correctly identify the same kind of administrative compatibility that will allow organic interfacing and integration.
3. The dual purpose must be a structural integration, not a rhetorical pairing. The CCC was not a propaganda camp for Army officers to wax on rhetorically about military reform. Army offices were needed to run the camps, not pontificate. The institutional gains of the Army though the period of the CCC’s operation were the byproduct of the administrative arrangement, not the stated objective of the program. This is what differentiates a policy initiative that becomes a political battlefield and one that works and delivers. A successful policy initiative needs its multiple layers and objectives to BE a single movement, and NOT a syncretic bundle. 

The current policy space needs a course correction as the political capital we gain going into 2029 is finite and at risk of being squandered on political projects that have no staying power. It is vital that policy makers learn the lessons from successful policy initiatives if they want their policies to survive long enough to make the desired effect. To this end, we will be launching a series exploring policy initiatives that could be effective for a 2029 platform, using the lessons learned from the CCC. The next piece in this series  will be a proposal on increasing internet access for rural communities to help reduce the opioid epidemic through telehealth access.